Legal Insights

Limiting the Boundaries of Governmental Immunity: What Pennsylvania's New Ruling Means for School District Liability in Sexual Abuse Cases 

June 24, 2025
By: Joel H. Feigenbaum and Jaiden J. Moore

On June 9, 2025, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued a landmark decision with major implications for school districts and other public agencies. In L.F.V. v. South Philadelphia High School, no. 218 C.D. 2023, 2025 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 105, 2025 WL 1617645, a case involving sexual misconduct between students, the Court held that school districts may face liability when their own negligence enables sexual abuse – even if the alleged abuser is not a school district employee. 

In the first interpretation of the 2019 “sexual abuse” exception to governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) by a Pennsylvania appellate court – state or federal – the decision affirms a broader interpretation of the exception for Pennsylvania trial courts to follow. 

The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 

The PSTCA is a Pennsylvania statute that generally provides immunity to local government agencies from tort liability. Enacted to protect the public fiscally, the Act reflects a policy judgment which acknowledges that the financial burden of civil lawsuits could jeopardize the delivery of essential public services. Unchecked litigation exposure may divert public funds away from education, infrastructure, and public safety, which in turn could harm the communities these institutions serve. 

However, to balance public safety with accountability, the Act carves out several exceptions to governmental immunity, and in 2019, the Pennsylvania Legislature added a notable new exception: claims involving sexual abuse. 

The Interpretive Question Since 2019

Since its enactment, state and federal trial courts have wrestled with how far the 2019 sexual abuse exception extends. Two competing interpretations emerged:

• Narrow View: A governmental agency, such as a school district, may only be liable for sexual abuse under negligence theories of liability if a government agent, like a teacher, coach, or administrator, personally commits the abuse. 

• Broad View: A governmental agency, such as a school district, may be liable if its own negligence enables the sexual abuse – regardless of whether the abuser is a school district employee or a third-party. 

L.F.V.: Sexual Misconduct Between Students during School Supervision

L.F.V. involved three minor students at a Philadelphia public school – two boys and one girl – who were allegedly unsupervised behind the bleachers during a physical education class when the boys sexually assaulted the female student. The plaintiffs – the girl’s parents – argued that the district should be liable for negligence that enabled the sexual abuse – not the sexual abuse itself – because it failed to adequately supervise the students and otherwise prevent the sexual abuse from occurring. In response, the district sought to dismiss the action, arguing that immunity applied because the perpetrators were not district employees. The Commonwealth Court rejected the district’s argument. 

The Court’s Reasoning

In reaching its decision, the Court relied on two cases involving third-party tortfeasors, including:

• A police chase lawsuit, where a city police officer’s alleged negligence in pursuing a fleeing suspect contributed to an auto collision which injured the plaintiff, despite the accident being caused by the fleeing suspect. In that case, our Supreme Court held that the municipality may be held jointly liable for negligence even though its actions did not directly injure the plaintiff.

• A signage error lawsuit, where the plaintiffs were injured when they and a drunk driver collided while driving in opposite directions. The drunk driver, however, was not entirely at-fault.  The municipality had wrongly placed a directional marker that directed the drunk driver to turn into the plaintiffs’ driving lane. In that case, our Supreme Court held that if the specific facts allege that a local agency’s joint negligence with the third party, then the local agency may be held liable.

These cases established a principle: a public agency may be liable where its own negligence is a substantial factor in causing harm, even when the harm is caused by the criminal act of a third party, e.g., a drunk or fleeing driver, or a minor student. Further, the Court found persuasive the legislative intent behind the 2019 amendment. Citing floor statements from State Representative Rossi – the amendment’s sponsor – the Court noted the Legislature’s intent was to hold municipalities accountable where their negligence enabled sexual abuse. The Court emphasized that this interpretation does not presume liability, but rather eliminates immunity where agency negligence is plausibly alleged. 

What This Means for Public Agencies

In a distinctive win for the plaintiff’s bar, which has been grappling with this issue in venues across Pennsylvania, this ruling sends a clear message: the fact that sexual abuse was not perpetrated by a governmental actor, such as a school district employee, does not automatically preclude an agency’s liability. Districts and other public agencies may be held liable for sexual abuse even when no employee or agent commits the misconduct – so long as the agency’s negligence contributed to the harm alleged by the plaintiff. Key takeaways for school districts and local agencies include:

• Third-party abuse does not automatically shield a school district from liability.

• Early litigation strategy may need to shift, as complete immunity defenses will be harder to claim at the pleadings stage. 

• Plaintiffs must still demonstrate that a school district or other governmental agency’s negligence (i.e. failure to supervise, failure to train, failure to warn, etc.) contributed to their abuse by a third-party.

This ruling is a significant development for school districts and local governments throughout Pennsylvania. Agencies should consult legal counsel to reassess their risk management policies and training programs in light of this evolving legal landscape. Post & Schell will continue to monitor this area and advise clients on practice steps to minimize exposure under this recent interpretation of the PSTCA. 

If you have any questions about this new ruling, please contact Joel H. Feigenbaum, Principal, Casualty Litigation Department and Hospitality and Retail Practice Group, Jaiden J. Moore, Associate, Casualty Litigation Department and Hospitality and Retail Practice Group, or the lawyer at the Firm with whom you regularly consult.